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Abstract
A heated debate has arisen
over what Modigliani has dubbed the
Macro Rational Expections (MRE)hypothesis. This hypothesis embodiestwo
component hypotheses: 1) rational expectationsand 2) short—run neutrality
——i.e., that anticipated changes inaggregate demand will have already been
taken into account in economicagents' behavior and will thus evokeno out-
put or employment response. Together these
component hypotheses imply that
deterministic feedback policy rules willhave no effect on businesscycle
fluctuations. The irrelevance of thesetypes of policy rules is inconsis-
tent with much previous macrotheorizing as well as with the views of
policymakers. It is thus an extremely
controversial proposition which
requires a wide range of empirical research.
This paper is a sequel to aprevious paper by the author. That
paper developed a methodology for testing the MREhypothesis and found that
anticipated money growth does matter to the businesscycle. This paper
extends the analyses to cases where therate of nominal GNP growth or the
inflation rate, rather thanmoney growth, is the aggregate demand variable.
The empirical results are alsonegative on the MRE hypothesis and its
corresponding policy ineffectiveness proposition.
Frederic S. Mishkin
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A heated debate has arisenover what Modigliani has dubbed theMacro
Rational Expectations (MRE) hypothesis.This hypothesis which is associ-
ated with the work of RobertLucas, Thomas Sargent, and NeilWallace, em-
bodies two component hypotheses:
1) rational expectations and 2)short—run
neutrality——i.e., that anticipated changes inaggregate demand will have
already been taken into account in economicagents' behavior and will thus
evoke no output or employmentresponse. Together these component hypothe-
ses imply that deterministic feedbackpolicy rules will have no effect
on business cycle fluctuations. Theirrelevance of these types ofpolicy
rules is inconsistent with muchprevious macro theorizing as well as with
the views of policymakers. It is thusan extremely controversial proposi-
tion which requires a widerange of empirical research.'
This paper is a sequel to a previouspaper by the author. That paper
developed a methodology for testing the MitEhypothesis and applied it to
the case which has received the
most attention, where money growth is the
aggregate demand policy variable. However, otherresearch has focused on
cases where the rate of nominal GNP growth2or the inflation rate,3 rather
than money growth, is theaggregate demand variable. The results in these
cases have been mixed in their support of theMRE hypothesis and further
evidence seems necessary if we are tocome closer to a resolution of the
debate. This has led to this paper'sempirical analysis of whether antici-
pated values of these aggregate demand variablesmatter.2
II. THE METhODOLOGY
The methodology for the empirical analysis to follow is onlyoutlined
briefly here. My earlier paper has a moreextensive treatment of the
methodology and the reader isreferred there for more details.
The tests here are based on amodel of the form
N
(1) = +E(Xt1 -x.) +
where
=unemploymentor real output at time t
y =naturallevel of unemployment or real outputat time t,
X =aggregatedemand policy variable, eithernominal GNP growth
or inflation, at timet,




Rational expectations implies that the anticipationsof will be
formed optimally, using all available information,and as is usual in this
literature, models are assumed to be linear.A forecasting equation which
can be used to generate these anticipationsis
(2) X=Zy+U
where
=avector of variables used to forecast X.which are available
at time t—l,
y =avector of coefficients
=anerror term which is assumed tobe uncorrelated with any
information available at t—l (which includesZ or uk k,t ,t3.
for all i1 and hence tlk,.t is seriallyuncorrelated).3
An optima], forecast for then simply involvestaking expectatjo5 of
equation (2) conditional on informationavailable at t—l. Hence:
(3)




Thereare two identification problems thatoccur in the equation (4)
nxdel. Some assumption on thecorrelation of the error term,c, and the
right—hand side variables isnecessary in order to identify the 8—coefficients.
Theusual assumption, and the one that isused in the tests here as wellas
In previous empirical workon this subject, holds that all theright—hand
side variables areexogenous and hence are uncorrelated with theerror term.
This assumptjon,that (4) isa true reduced form,implies that leastsquares
estimation methods willyield consistent estimates ofthe t3's.
The above assumption ismore tenuous for the analysis inthis paper
than was true for previous work
where money growth is takenas the aggregate
demand policy variable.Although the exogeneity ofmoney growth in
output or unemployment equations isby no means uncontroversial,econo-
mists are more willing toassume the exogeneity ofmoney growth than the
exogeneity of nominal GNP growth or inflationin these equations. For
this reason we must be more
cautious in interpreting the resultsto follow.4
However, they are of Interest becausethey do confirm the previousfindings
with money growth and shedlight on other evidence wherenominal GNP
growth an4 Inflation are theaggregate demand variables.
The other identification
problem has been raised bySargent (l976b).
If includes only lagged valuesof and there are no restrictionson the
lag length N, the model in (4) is
observationaiiy equivalent to "anunnatural4
rate model" where anticipated aggregate
demand policy also matters. Hence,
in this case we cannot distinguishbetween the two competing hypothesesdis-
cussed in this paper. This so—called
observational equivalence problem has
arisen in empirical work on whether
anticipated aggregate demand policy matters,
in particular that by Jean Grossman.Grossman analyzes the equation (4)
model where the aggregate demandvariable is nominal GNP growth. However,
his forecasting equation
includes only lags of nominal GNP growth asex-
planatory variables, so hismodel suffers from observationalequivalence.5
Thus Grossman's study containslittle information on the questionof
whether anticipated aggregatedemand policy matters.
The observational equivalence problem canbe overcome, however——and
it is in the tests of this paper——if Z.
includes lagged values of at least
one other variable besides which does not enter equation (4) separately
from the 8.(Xt - terms.Now enough parameters of the equation are
identified so that tests of the MRE hypothesisare feasible. A more extensive
discussion of this issue can befound in Andrew Abel and the authorand
the reader is referred therefor more details.
EstimationIs sues
There are two methods that have been used toestimate the equation (4)
model. Barro (1977) uses a two—step procedurewhere the forecasting equation
(2) is estimated by ordinary least squares(OLS)over the sample period and
the residuals from this regression are then used as the unanticipated aggre-
gate demand variable in (4). Testsof the neutrality proposition then involve
adding current and lagged valuesof the aggregate demand variable to (4)and
testing with OLS the null hypothesisthat their coefficients are equal to
zero.5
Although this procedure generatesconsistent parameter estimates,it
does not yield correct teststatistics. It implicitlyassumes that the
covarlance of the 8 and Y estimatesare zero. When there areoff—diagonai
elements in the information matrixof the joint estimates,as there will
be here, then ignoring themas in the two—step procedure leadsto test
statistics that do not have thecorrect 4symptotjc distributions.This
can lead to inappropriate inference.
As was shown inmy earlier paper,
if anything, the two—stepprocedure is biased against the MREhypothesis.
A joint nonlinear estimationprocedure discussed in more detailin my
earlier paper avoids this problemby allowing for off—diagonal elementsin
the information matrix. It alsoproduces more efficient parameterestj--
mates because each equation makesuse of information from the other inthe
estimation process. Another advantageis that it allows tests of both
the neutrality and rationalityimplications of the MRE hypothesis,while
the two—step procedure can test forneutrality only.
The joint nonlinear estimatjonprocedure is used to estimate the
(2) and (4) system, imposing therationality constraint that y is equal
in both equations, Non—linear least
squares estimation proceeds here with
the appropriate heteroscedasticitycorrections discussed in my earlier
work and the same identifying
assumption that equation (4) is a truere-
duced form.,6
The(2) and (4) system and the MREhypothesis embodies two sets of
constraints. The neutrality propositionimplies that output and unemployment
deviations from their natural levelsare not correlated with the anticipated
movements in the aggregate demand variable.That is, 5. =0for all i in
N N
=y*+Z —X.) + Z&x.+
i=06







The joint test involves a likelihoodratio test for whether the (2)
and (4) system satisfies the rationality
constraints, y=', and the neutrality
constraints, tS.= 0.This likelihood ratio statistic_2log(LC/L) is dis-
tributed asymptotically asx2(q) where
q =isthe nuxtber of constraints
LC =likelihoodof the estimated constrained (2) and(4) system
LU =likelihoodof the estimated unconstrained system,(2) and (6)
where y=y is not imposed.
With the non—linear least squaresestimatiOn here it-.equals
2n[lOg(SSR) —log(SSRUYI
where
SSRc =sumof squared residuals from theconstrainedsystem,
SSRU =sumof squared residuals from the unconstrained system.
If the joint hypothesis ofrationality and neutrality were rejected,
we can obtain information onhow much the rationality versusthe neutrality
constraints contribute to this rejection.A sensible nesting of the hypo-
thesis testing proceeds as follows.
The neutrality constraints are tested
under the maintained hypothesisof rational expectations by constructing a
likelihood ratio statistic as abovewhere the constrained system is (2)and
(4) while the unconstrained systemis (2) and (6) again with the rationality
constraints, yy, imposed. A separatetest for the rationality constraints
proceeds similarly where theconstrained system is (2) and (6) imposingyrr
and the unconstrained system is (2)and (6) where y=y is not imposed.7
In the models estimated here,the number Of lags in theunemploy-
ment or output equations is solarge that spurious rejections mightoccur be-
cause the small sample distributions of thetest statistics differ substantially
from the asymptotic distributions. Inorder to be certain that any rejections
of the MRE hypothesis are valid, themodels discussed in the text are estimated
with the smoothness restriction that thecoefficients of the unanticipated
and anticipated aggregate demand variables liealong a fourth order polynomial
with an endpoint constraint. Thisparticular polynomial distributed lag (PDL)
specification was chosen because it israrely rejected by the data,8 it makes
interpretation of the coefficients easier, and it hasthe advantage of using
up few degrees of freedom. As the comparison of the text andAppendix II
indicate, use of the PDL restriction leads to similarstatistical inference
on the validity of the MRE hypothesis,so we can be confident that thereare
no spurious rejections of the MRE hypothesisbecause of small sample bias.
Granger and Newbold (1974) have pointed outthe danger of conductjna
inference in a regression model wherethe serial correlation of theerror
term is ignored. To avoid this "spuriousregression" phenomenon i the out-
put and unemployment equations a correction forserial correlation isnecessary
that results in white noise residuals.Here the error termof (4) and (6)
is assumed to be a fourth—order ARprocess because fourth—order autoregressions
are usually successful in eliminating serialcorrelation from quarterly,
macro time series. This serial correlationcorrection is indeed Successful
in reducing the residuals to whitenoise.
Specification Issues
It is difficult on theoreticalgrounds to exclude any piece of informa-
tion available at time t—l as a usefulpredictor of a policy variable.
Policymakers might react to this informationeven though there is no theoreti—
cal model that suggests that this shouldoccur. Thus it might end up being a8
useful predictor of policy and should be included in the Z—vector in (2).
This reasoning suggests that an atheoreticalstatistical procedure based
on the predictive content of informationis the appropriate way to specify
the variables belonging in the forecastingequatiofl)0 The procedure used
here and in my previous work amounts to runningmultivariate, Granger
tests. The policy variable X, is regressed onits ownfourlagged values
(again to insure white noise residuals) aswell as on four lagged values
of a wide ranging set of macro variables, such as:the quarterly Ml or
M2 growth rate, the inflation rate, nominalGISt?growth,the unemployment
rate, the treasury bill rate, the growthrate of real government expendi-
ture, the high employment surplus,
the growth rate of the federal debt and
the balance of payments on currentaccount. The four lagged values of
each of the variables are retained in the equationonly if they are
jointly significant at the five percentlevel. One advantage of this pro-
cedure is that it imposes discipline onthe researcher that prevents his
searching over forecasting equation specifications
that lead to results
confirming his priors.
Earlier research on the MRE hypothesiswith an equation (4) model
[for example, Robert Barro (1977, 1978),Robert Barro and Mark Rush,
Jean Grossman and Leonardo Leiderman] hasused a fairly short lag
length——two years or less——on theanticipated and unanticipated X
variables. This paper looks at longer lag lengthsfor two reasons.
Experimenting with plausible, lessrestrictive models that have
longer lag lengths is an appropriate strategyfor analyzing the robust-
ness of results because this onlyhas the disadvantage of a potential
decrease in the power of tests but will notresult in incorrect test
statistics.12 In addition estimates in this paper and in Robert
Gordon find that unanticipated aggregatedemand variables lagged as9
far back as twenty quarters
are significantly correlatedwith output
and unemployment.
III. THE RESULTS
The estimated models in thetext use seasonally adjusted,postwar
quarterly data over the 1954—76 period and
the methodology Outlined
in the previous section. Thesample starts with the first quarter of1954
because this was the earliestpossible start date when models withlong
lags are estimated. The data are discussedin more detail in the data
appendix. In pursuit of information
on robustness, both output and unem—
ployinent models are estimated in thispaper with nominal GNP growth and
inflation as the aggregate demandvariable. The natural level ofunem-
ployment or output,y, is estimated here as a simple time trend as in
Barro (1978). A more complicated Barro(1977) specification has been
avoided because, as is Indicatedby David Small and Barro (1979), its
validity is doubtful.
The first step in pursuing theMRE tests is to specify thevariables
entering the forecasting equations fornominal GNP growth and inflation.
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=.7411Standard Error =.00347Durbin-WatSon =1.74
where
NGNP =quarterlyrate of growth of nominal GNP
11= quarterlyrateof growth of the GNPdeflator
M2G =quarterlyrate of growth of average M2
RTB=averagetreasury bill rate
andstandarderrors of the coefficients arein parentheses.13 Table 1provides
F-statistics of the joint tests forsignificant explanatory powerof the four
lagged values of each variablein the list of potential elanatOryvariables.14
Nomifla]- GNP Growth asthe Aggre9ate Demand, X Var
The modelsin Table 2 follow Robert Gordonand Jean Grossman in
using nominal GNP growth asthe aggregate demand variablein the output and
unemploymentequations. They have beenestimated from the (2) and (4) systems,
imposingthe cross_equation constraintsthat the -areequal in both equations.
The resulting y estimates
for the models of Table 2 andthe tables that follow
can be found in AppendixIII. Twenty lagged quartersof unanticipated nominal
GNP growth have been includedin the models because coefficientson lags as
far back as this are significantly
different from zero at the 5%level——a
result confirmed by Gordon.
The signs and shape of the 2.1and 2.2 models are sensible, with an
increase in unanticipated nominalGNP growth usually associatedwith an in-
crease in output or a decrease
in unemployment. The fit of these equationsTABLE 1
Joint Tests for Significant
Explanatory Power in (7) and (8)
of Four Lags of Each Variable
























































The F—statjstjcstest the nullhypothesis that the coefficientson the four lagged values of each of thesevariables equals zero. The marginalsig- nificance level is the probability offinding that value of F or higher under
the null hypothesis. For theNGNP and M2G tests in (7), theF—statistic is distributed as F(4,83), while for thetests of the other variables in (7),the F—statistic is distributed as F(4,79).For the ii,RTBand M2G tests in (8) the F—statistic is distributedas F(4,79), while for the tests of theother variables in (8), the F—statistic isdistributed as F(4,75).
NGNP =quarterlyrate of growth of real GNP
=quarterlyrate of growth of the GNP deflator
RTB =average90—day treasury bill rate
M2G =quarterlyrate of growth of average M2
M1G =quarterlyrate of growth of average Ml
UN =averageunemployment rate
RGNP =quarterlyrate of growth of real GNP
G=quarterlyrate of growth of real federalgovernment expenditure
BOP =averagebalance of payments on currentaccount









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is also good——for example, compare
them with the results in myearlier paper,
or those in the Table6——and several of the coefficients onunanticipated
nominal GNP growth even exceedtheir asymptotic standard errorsby a factor
of ten. The good fit is not
surprising because we would expectnominal GNP
fluctuations to accuratelytrack short—run movements inreal GNP or unemploy-
ment if price level movementsare smooth.
Despite these attractive results,Table 3 indicates that the MRE
hypothesis is not supported. Boththe unemployment and output models lead to
strong rejections of the joint hypothesis:In the output model, the rejection
is at the .00001 level, and is at the .0009level in the unemploymentmodel.15
The most interesting aspect of theseresults is that there is very little
contribution to these rejections from therationality constraints. In both
models, the data do not reject therationality of expectations. The culprit
behind the joint hypothesis rejectionsis the neutrality proposition.
These neutrality rejections areexceedingly strong: the probability of
finding that value of thelikelihood ratio statistic or higher underthe
null hypothesis of neutrality is1 in 2000 for the unemployment model,and
1 in 200,000 for the output model!Clearly in these models, anticipated
nominal GNP growth does matter, and rejectionof the neutrality constraints
cannot be blamed on the failureof the maintained hypothesis ofrationality.16
We can achieve a deeper understandingof the test results in Table 3
by studying the estimated outputand unemployment equations where currentand
lagged anticipated nominal growth areadded as explanatory variables. Tables
4 and 5 contain the results from the (2)and (6) system with rational expecta-
tions imposed. As we would expect fromTable 3, many of the coefficients on
anticipated nominal GNP growth are significantly
different from zero at the
1% level, with some asymptotict—statistics even exceeding seven in absolute
value. Of course these coefficientscould be statistically significant, yet
unimportant from an economic viewpoint.This is clearly not the case. Theha
TABLE 3
Likelihood Ratio Tests for the Models ofTABLE 2
Model No. 2.1 22
Joint Hypothesis
Likelihood RatIo Statistic x2(h1) =43.19** X2(h1) =3l.69**
Marginal Significance Level 1.01 x .0009
Neutrality
Likelihood Ratio Statistic x2(4) =30.22** x2(4) =19.90**
Marginal Significance Level 4.41x106 .0005
Rationality
Likelihood Ratio Statistic x2(7) =12.86 x2(7) =11.28
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coefficients on anticipated nominal GNP
growth are of a sixriilar magnitudeto
the coefficients on unanticipatednominal GNP growth. Contrary towhat is
implied by the MRE hypothesis,anticipated aggregate demandpolicyas repre-
sented by nominal GNP growth does
not appear to be obviously less important
than unanticipated aggregatedemand policy.
Inflation as the Aggregate Demand, X,Variable
Thenext set of results explores aLucas (1973) supply functionof the
type estimated by Sargent(l976a)
17Table 6 presents the outputand unemploy-
mentequations estimated fromthe constrained (2)and (4) system. The seventeen
quarterlag length on unanticipated
inflation has been included inthe models
again because coefficients onlags as far back asthis are significantly
different from zero at the 5%level.
Table 6 confirms Ray Fair's findingfor a similar sample period that
the coefficients on unanticipated
inflation have the opposite sign to
that predicted by the Lucas supplyfunction. Sargent's (1976a)
contradictory
finding probably stems fromhis use of a sample periodthat does not
include 1974—1975. Sargent takes
unanticipated inflation to be a response to
aggregate demand shiftswhich might have been a morereasonable assumption -
forthe sample period he used in
estimation. However, it is plausiblethat
the supply shock effectof a decreased supply offood and energy during 1974
and 75——which would belinked to an unanticipated upward
movement in the
U.S. inflation rate coupledwith an output decline——isdominating the
aggregate demand effectson unanticipatedinflation in the data usedhere.
Thus the estimated coefficientsOfl unanticipatedinflation are not in—

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Likelihood Ratio Tests for the Models of TABLE6
Model No. 6.1 6.2
Joint Hypothesis




LikelihoodRatio Statistic X2(4) =18.52** X2(4)13.20*
MarginalSignificance Level .0010 .0104
Rationality
LikelihoodRatio Statistic 2(11) =10.23 2(11) 20.16*
Marginal Significance Level
.5098 .043213
Thelikelihood ratio tests in Table7 indicate that the MREhypothesis
isnot supported for the models withinflation as the aggregate demandvan—
able.The joint hypothesis isrejected for both modelsat the 5% Signi-
ficance level, with theneutrality hypothesis the majorcontributorto
these rejections. The
neutrality constraints are rejected at the.001
marginal significance level for theoutput model and .01 for theunemployment
model. The rationality constraintsagain fare better with the marginal
significance levels equaling .siforthe output'model and .04 for theunemploy-
ment model. The evidence thenagain seems to be quite negativeon the
neturality implication of the MREhypothesis, but far less so on therationality
implication.
Tables 8 and 9 show that,contrary to the NRE hypothesis, the effects
from unanticipated inflationare not stronger than anticipated inflation.Not
onlyare the coefficients Ofl anticipatedinflation Substantially larger than
the unanticipated coefficients, buttheir asymptotic t—statistjcsare sub-
stantiallylarger as well.
Overall then, the Lucas supply modelestimated here is not successful.
It has coefficients with the"wrong" sign, fits the data worse thana cor-
respondingmodel with money growth as theaggregate demand variable as in
Barro and Rush and my earlierpaper, and leads to strong rejections of
neutralitywith anticipated inflationproving to be more significantly
correlated with output and unemploymentthan unanticipated inflation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence here doesnot support the proposition implied
by the MRE hypothesis that onlyunanticipated aggregate demand policymatters.
This is consistent with thefindings in my earlier paper. With the
aggregate demand policy variable specified to be either nominal GNP growth



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































demandvariablesare not found to be much less importantthan the unanticipated
variables in the estimated models,and the constraints implied byneutrality are
rejected in every test in this paper.Furthermore, these rejections are
frequently at exceedingly small marginal significancelevels. For example,
in one test the probability of finding thatvalue of the likelihood ratio
statistic under the null hypothesis of neutralityis only 1 in 200,000.
The hypothesis of rational expectations,the other element in the
MRE hypothesis, fares much better in theempirical tests here. Although the
rationality hypothesis does not come outunscathedthere is one rejection
at the five percent level, but justbarely—--it is not rejected in any other
tests in the text at the 5%level.1Rejections of the joint hypothesisof
rationality and neutrality are thus seento occur primarily because of the
rejections of neutrality rather thanrationality. This result might give
some encouragement to those who arewilling to assume rationality of expecta-
tions in constructing their macro models, yetare unwilling to assert the
short—run neutrality of policy.
There is one qualification of theresults that warrants further dis-
cussion. This paper has followed
previous research in this area by
using the identifying assumptionthat the output and unemployment equations
aretruereduced forms. However, with inflation ornominal GNP growth as
the aggregate demand variable,this assumption is not without suspicion.
It is not clear whether the invalidityof this assumption might lead to
rejections of the MRE hypothesis evenif it were true. Some cautionin
interpreting these results is thereforewarranted.However, this work
along with my earlier paper does castdoubt on previous evidence that is
cited as supporting the view that only unanticipatedmacro policy is
relevant to the business cycle.A].
APPENDIX I
VARIABLESANDSOURCESOF DATA
M2G =averagegrowth rate (quarterly rate) of M2, calculatedas the
change in the log of quarterly M2 (fromthe NBER data bank)
RTB =averagetreasury bill rate at an annual rate (infractions), from
the MPSdatabank
it= inflation(quarterly rate), calculated as the changes in the log
of the GN'P deflator (from the MPS databank)
GNP =realGNP(billions1972 $),fromthe NPSdatabank
UN=averagequarterly unemployment rate (from theMPSdatabank)
NGNP=growthrate (quarterly rate) of nominal GNP, calculatedas the
change in the log of nominal GNP, from the MPSdatabank.
Theother variables used in the searchprocedure for the forecasting equations







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Likelihood Ratio Tests for the Models of Table2A





2 2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic x (28)5789** x (28) =7l.2j,**
MarginalSignificance Level - OOO8 1.25 x1O
Neutrality
2 2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic x (21) =56.ll**x (21) =64.04**
Marginal Significance Level 4.86 x1O 3.07 XlO
Rationality
2 2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic x (7) 1.85 x (7) =4.20








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic
x (29)64.38**x (29)57•Q3** Marginal Significance Level .0002 .0014
Neutrality
2 2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic x (18) =43,51**x (18)3393* Marginal Significance Level .0007 .0129
Rationality
2 2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic x (11) 22.33* x (11) =32.01* Marginal Significance Level .0219 .0008A6
APPENDIX III
Jointly Estimated Forecasting Equations
TABLE Al
NominalGNP Growth Forecasting Equations, Estimated Jointly
with Output and Unemployment Equations
For Model #
Explanatory Remarks for TablesAl and A2: Forecasting equations wereestimated with
the output or unemployment equation imposingthe cross—equation constraints
that y is equal in both equations. For purposes
of comparison, OLS column
shows the estimate of the unconstrainedforecasting equation in (7) or (8)..
4.1 5.1 2. lÀ 2. 2A OLS









































































































































Inflation Forecasting Equations, EstimatedJointly
with Output and Unemployment Equations
For Model 1/
Coefficient of 6.1 6.2 8.1 9.1 6.1A 6.2A OLS
Constant Term —.0011 —.0012 —.0005 —.0005 —.0011 —.0012 —.0008
(.0010) (.0010) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
.2040* .2405* .2408* .2225**.2126* .2343* .2477*
(.1030) (.1039) (.0953) (.0861) (.1028) (.1088) (.1054)
.1259 .1314 .1491 .1710 .0976 .1580 .1598
(.1053) (.1067) (.0993) (.0804) (.1056) (.1100) (.1087)
.2280* .2087* .2249* .2196* .1810 .2271* .2744*
(.1048) (.1057) (.0999) (.0815) (.1034) (.1088) (.1089)
.0888 .0240 .0549 .0913 .1541 —.0019 .0466
(.1003) (.1020) (.0953) (.0803) (.0957) (.1039) (.1036)
RTB .2284**.2280**.2890**.2269**.2400**.2432**.2513** t1
(.0802) (.0804) (.0747) (.0656) (.0701) (.0804) (.0816)
RTB —.1093 —.1208 —.1563 —.1018 —.0490 —.1378 —.1311 t—2
(.1308) (.1323) (.1273) (.0987) (.1092) (.1303) (.1324)
RTB .1819 .1832 .1824 .1849 .0250 .1806 .1684 t—3
(.1471) (.1488) (.1385) (.1154) (.1242) (.1464) (.1490)
RTB .2408* .2134* _.2366* _2530** —.1549.2107* —.2423* t-4 (.0991) (.0991) (.0936) (.0845) (.0894) (.0996) (.1018)
M2G .1271 .1147 .0889 .0238 .1432 .1249 .1234 t1 (.0907) (.0915) (.0819) (.0734) (.0842) (.0906) (.0935)
M2G .0083 —.0042 —.0238 .0886 —.0364 .0052 .0051 t—2
(.1188) (.1201) (.1104) (.0846) (.1073) (.1167) (.1104)
N2G .2093* .1982 .2082* .0948 .2029* .1678 .1874 t—3
(.1067) (.1079) (.1025) (.0797) (.0984) (.1060) (.1090)
M2G _.2212**_.1964* _.2513** _.1464* —.1844* _.1845* _.2240** t—4
(.0845) (.0853) (.0778) (.0704) (.0793) (.0858) (.0868)
.7369 .7367 .7359 .7306 .7263 .7371 .7411
.00347 .00347 .00352 .00355 .00370 .00363 .00347
D—W 1.92 1.99 2.01 1.92 1.65 1.70 1.74Fl
FOOTNOTES
*Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of
Chicago and Research Associate, National Bureau of EconomicResearch.
I thank an anonymous referee; the participants in the money workshops at
the University of Chicago and the University of Virginia for their helpful
comments; and the National Science Foundation for research support.The
usual disclaimer applies.
1Some of the recent work on this proposition is as follows:
Robert Barro (1977, 1978, 1979), Robert Barro and Mark Rush, Jean Grossman,
David Germany and S. Srivastava, Robert Gordon, Leonardo Leiderman,and
David Small.
2Jean Grossman and Robert Gordon.
3momas Sargent (1976a) and Ray Fair.
4Note that the endogeneity of the aggregate demand variable does
not necessarily produce invalid test statisticsfor this model. For example,
In th case where only contemporaneousM_Me enters In equation (4), test
statistics are valid even if the exogeneity of X isassumed when this is
untrue. See Andrew Abel and the author. However,itis not clear that
this desirable result——that the above assumptiondoes not matter to the
tests of Interest here——carries over to the casewhere lagged M_Me enter
equation(4).
5Because of the observational equivalence problem Grossman cannot,
and does not, test using Barro's (1977) procedure whetherthe anticipated
nominal GNP growth variables significantly add to the explanatory power
of his equation (4) model. Instead Grossman reportsresults supporting the
MRE hypothesis which rely on flimsy grounds foridentification, namely the
assumption that the lag length on nominal GNP growth cutsoff at six quarters.F2
6Goldfeld—Quandt tests do not reveal thepresence of hetero—
scedasticity within the (2) and (4) equations estimated here and it is only
necessary to correct for it across equations,as in my earlier paper.
7Theconstrained—system is estimated with iterated non—linear least
squares and it thus approaches full information maximum likelihood (FIML).
The unconstrained system is estimated using the variance—covariance matrix
estimate from the constrained system in order to correct for one smallsample
problem. This results in a likelihood ratio statistic that is slightly
more conservative: i.e., it will be less likely to reject the null hypothe-
sis. See my earlier paper for a more detailed explanation of why this
procedure was followed.
8The PDL constraintsare not rejected in models where inflation is
the aggregate demand, X variable. For example, in model 6.1 x2(14) =20.54
and in model 6.2 x2(l4) =10.62:the critical x2(14) at 5% is 23.7. The
PDL constraints receive less support in the models using nominal GNP as the
X variable. They are not rejected for the 2.1 output model at the 5% level,
but are nearly so: x(l7) =26.95,while the critical 2(l7) at 5% is
27.6. However, they are rejected at the 1% level in the unemployment equation:
=34.91,while the critical 2(l7) at 1% is 33.4. I did pursue
experiments with an 8th order PDL to see if this would fit the data sub-
stantially better, but it did not. Although this rejection of the PDL con—
straints is bothersome, the fact that the unrestricted models in Appendix
II yield such similar results to those in Tables 2 and 3 indicates that
imposing or not imposing the PDL constraints does not change any conclusions.
9The Durbin—Watson statistics for range from 1.82 to 2.15, none
of which indicates the presence of first—order serial correlation. Further-
more, the Ljung and Box adjusted Q—statistics for the first twieve auto—
correlations of cannot reject the null hypothesis that these autocorrela—F3
tions are zero. The Q(12) statistics range from 5.84 to 15.0, while the
critical Q(12) at 5% is 15.5.
10See Thomas Sargent (1981).
Note that a stepwise regression procedure might miss significant
explanatory variables because of the order that it chooses to run the
regressions. Thus some judgment must be exercised in conducting a more
general search to find a specification that includes any variables with
significant explanatory power.
12Because rejections of the null hypothesis are less likely when
the power of the test is reduced by the addition of irrelevant variables,
a rejection at a standard significance level in a less restrictivemodel
is even stronger evidence against the null hypothesis.
13Chow tests which split the sample in equal halves indicate that
the nominal GNP growth forecasting equation does have the desirable property
that the stability of the coefficients cannot be rejected. F(9,74) =.60
while the critical F at 5% is 2.0. However, stability of the coefficients
of the inflation equation is rejected: F(13,66) =3.40while the critical
F at 5% is 1.9.
14The F tests here are not meant to describe what regressions
were run in order to achieve the final specification. They onlyshow
how much marginal explanatory power each variable has, once the first
specification was decided upon. The specification was approached by running
regressions with many more variables than in (7) or (8) and paringthe
specification down by eliminating variables with little explanatory power,
as well as building up the specification from regressionswith fewer ex-
planatory variables. In cases where two variables were so highlycorrelated
that each but not both had significant explanatory power, the one thatF4
produced a lower standard error ofthe equation was chosen. Anexample of
this is the choice of M2 over Ml
growth in both equations (7) and (8).
15As inmy earlier paper, the long lags for theunanticipated
and anticipated nominal GNP variablesare critical to the negative find-
ings in the MRE hypothesis. For
example, an output model with only seven
lags of nominal GNP growth with the
lag coefficients freely estimated does
not reject the joint hypothesis: x2(15)=23.07while the critical
at 5% is 25.0. As explained inmy earlier paper, this failure to
reject is probably due to misspecifying thelag length as too short.
16Although theserejections are Consistent with the rsultsusing
money growth in my earlier paper, they aresubstantially stronger.
One possible explanation for thisfinding is that the higher correlation
of this aggregate demand variable withoutput or unemployment leads to
tests with greater power.
17As reported infootnote 13, the stability over time ofthe co-
efficients of the inflation forecastingequation was rejected. Thus we
should be somewhat more cautious ininterpreting the results here which
make use of this equation. However,as discussed in my earlier paper,
the specification of the forecastingequation is probably not a critical
issue in the findings because theerrors—in—variables problem from mis—
specification of the forecasting equation isprobably not severe,
l8 donot cite the rationality test results inAppendix II because,
as the discussion in my earlier paper indicates,they may not be reliable
because of small sample bias.R.1
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